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Abstract 
New software product development entails considerable risks. One significant risk is that decision 
makers can become overly committed to troubled software product development projects (i.e., 
escalation of commitment). While prior research has identified factors that promote escalation in 
information technology projects, there has been little attempt to leverage the context of software 
product development, which can include evaluating attributes of a software product under 
development and weighing a personal financial reward tied to a successful product launch. In this 
study, we conducted two experiments to investigate how evaluability bias concerning software 
attributes and the fairness effect that arises from the relative amount of a personal financial reward 
influence the escalation of commitment to troubled software product development projects. Our 
findings suggest that the escalation of commitment to troubled software product development 
projects is influenced by both evaluability bias, which affects the perceived attractiveness of a 
software product under development, and the fairness effect, which influences the perceived 
attractiveness of a personal financial reward tied to a successful product launch. This study 
contributes to both the information systems literature and the escalation literature by providing novel 
theoretical explanations as to why escalation occurs in the context of new software product 
development. 
Keywords: Escalation of Commitment, Software Product Development, Evaluability Bias, Fairness 
Effect. 
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1 Introduction 
New software product development is a critically 
important business process because it can lead to 
products that can help companies gain a competitive 
advantage by setting a new industry trend or creating a 
new niche market. Despite its potential returns, new 
software product development is not without risk. One 
significant risk is that decision makers can become 
overly committed to troubled product development 
projects (Biyalogorsky, Boulding, & Staelin, 2006; 
Boulding, Morgan, & Staelin, 1997)—a phenomenon 
known as escalation of commitment (Brockner, 1992; 
Staw, 1976, 1981). Prior research on new product 
development has shown that decision makers often fail 
to terminate or adequately redirect a new product 
development project despite negative signs and instead 
choose to invest additional resources into the troubled 
project (Biyalogorsky et al., 2006; Boulding et al., 
1997; Keil, Depledge, & Rai, 2007; Schmidt & 
Calantone, 2002). For example, when a competitor has 
already introduced a new product that is reportedly 
superior to a product under development, it may make 
sense to redirect or terminate the project rather than to 
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invest additional resources to complete and launch the 
product (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Failing to redirect 
troubled projects can lead to a significant waste of 
organizational resources and may adversely affect the 
company in other ways.  
Due to its significant implications in new product 
development settings, escalation of commitment has 
attracted interest among both marketing and 
information systems (IS) researchers (Biyalogorsky et 
al., 2006; Keil et al., 2007; Schmidt & Calantone, 
2002). However, our understanding of what drives 
escalation in new software product development is 
quite limited. Moreover, while prior IS research has 
identified several factors that promote escalation in IT 
projects (e.g., sunk cost and personal responsibility), it 
has failed to leverage the context of software product 
development, which can include evaluating attributes 
of a software product under development. When 
software product development projects go awry, 
evaluation of the software product’s attributes is one 
input that decision makers can use to judge the ultimate 
viability of such a product and whether it makes sense 
to continue the project as planned. Therefore, in this 
study we focus on a decision bias that we call 
evaluability bias, which is associated with evaluating a 
software product’ attributes, and investigate how it 
influences escalation of commitment in the context of 
software product development. Evaluability refers to 
the relative ease with which an attribute can be 
evaluated in relation to other attributes (Bazerman & 
Moore, 2013). When a decision maker is presented 
with a software product having two attributes and one 
of these is easier to evaluate than the other, this can 
result in evaluability bias, meaning that the easy-to-
evaluate attribute dominates the evaluation of the 
software product (i.e., the more difficult-to-evaluate 
attribute is neglected). Thus, the decision maker will 
perceive the software product to be attractive when the 
easy-to-evaluate attribute carries a superior value.  
The context of software product development also 
frequently involves personal financial rewards that are 
tied to a successful product launch. For example, at the 
outset of a project, the project manager might receive 
the promise of a financial reward for successfully 
launching a new product. Prior research on judgment 
and decision-making has found that people tend to 
favor a reward payoff structure that is perceived as 
being fair (Bazerman, White, & Loewenstein, 1995), a 
phenomenon that we call the fairness effect. Therefore, 
in this study we also aim to investigate the impact of 
the fairness effect on escalation of commitment in the 
context of software product development.  
Software product development represents a novel 
context in which to study escalation and by leveraging 
two features that are germane to this context, we are 
able to contribute to both the IS literature and the 
escalation of commitment literature, as escalation 
scholars have not previously investigated the impact of 
evaluability bias or the fairness effect. Furthermore, we 
chose to investigate these two factors in a single study, 
as they both have the potential to influence perceived 
attractiveness of project-related outcomes in new 
software product development, which can influence 
escalation decisions. Specifically, we propose that 
evaluability bias will affect the perceived 
attractiveness of a software product under 
development, and that the fairness effect will affect the 
perceived attractiveness of a personal financial reward 
tied to a successful product launch, both of which will 
promote the escalation of commitment to troubled 
software product development projects. In the sections 
that follow we report the results of two laboratory 
experiments that were conducted, one with IT 
undergraduate students and the other with IT 
professionals in order to test these ideas. We begin, 
however, with a review of relevant literature on 
escalation of commitment, evaluability bias, and the 
fairness effect. 
2 Escalation of Commitment and 
New Software Product 
Development 
Escalation of commitment was first investigated in an 
experiment by Staw (1976) who found that individuals 
allocate additional resources to a previously chosen but 
failing course of action due to personal responsibility 
for having initiated the course of action. Motivated by 
frequent media reports of runaway systems projects 
that seemed to take on lives of their own, IS researchers 
began focusing attention on the problem of IT project 
escalation beginning in the mid-1990s (Keil, 1995; 
Newman & Sabherwal, 1996). Over time, this topic has 
become one of enduring interest to both IS researchers 
(Heng, Tan, & Wei, 2003; Lee, Keil, & Kasi , 2012; 
Mähring, Keil,  Mathiassen, & Pries-Heje, 2008; Pan 
et al., 2004; G. Pan, S. Pan., & Flynn, 2006; Truex, 
Holmström, & Keil, 2006) and practitioners (Fichman, 
Keil, & Tiwana, 2005; Keil & Mähring, 2010). In 
addition, several researchers have explored the 
escalation phenomenon in the context of new product 
development (Biyalogorsky et al., 2006; Boulding et 
al. 1997; Keil et al., 2007; Schmidt & Calantone, 
2002). Notable factors that have been found to 
influence escalation decisions in new product 
development include sunk cost (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985), project completion level (Keil, Truex, & Mixon,  
1995), and personal responsibility for initiating a 
project (Schmidt & Calantone, 2002). Furthermore, 
drawing on risk-taking theory, Keil, Tan et al. (2000) 
showed that the decision maker’s risk perception has a 
significant influence on the decision to continue 
working on a software product development project 
despite negative feedback. 




Our focus on anticipatory outcomes (i.e., product 
launch and associated financial reward) differentiates 
our study from much of the prior work on escalation, 
which has addressed temporal factors that focus on the 
“past” or “present.” Much of the research on escalation 
of commitment has had a retrospective focus on factors 
that psychologically linked the decision maker to the 
troubled project—e.g., personal responsibility for 
having initiating the project (Staw, 1976), or prior 
investments that went into a project (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985; Garland, 1990). Escalation researchers have also 
found several psychological or social factors that can 
be thought of as “present” oriented, and these factors 
inextricably link the decision maker to the troubled 
project and promote project escalation (e.g., the 
decision maker is the project champion, experiences 
job insecurity, is emotionally attached to the project, or 
is subject to norms for consistency, etc.) (Brockner, 
1992; Keil, 1995; Newman & Sabherwal, 1996; 
Sabherwal, Sein, & Marakasc, 2003; Staw, 1981).  
There has been comparatively little work on “future”-
oriented factors that may drive escalation behavior. 
Conlon & Garland (1993) found that individuals 
become more willing to continue working on a 
troubled project when the project is near completion, 
and Moon (2001) confirmed this so-called “completion 
effect.” The role of prospective thinking in escalation 
decisions was further highlighted in a study by Wong 
and Kwong (2007), who found that individuals 
anticipate future outcomes in escalation situations and 
are more willing to continue pursuing a failing course 
of action when the possibility of future regret about 
withdrawal is high (i.e., anticipated regret).  
In the context of software product development, two 
anticipatory outcomes that are important to decision 
makers are: (1) a software product that is under 
development, and (2) a personal financial reward tied 
to a successful launch of a software product. However, 
prior research offers no explanations for what may 
influence the perceived attractiveness of these two 
anticipatory outcomes in the minds of decision makers 
who find themselves in escalation situations involving 
new software product development. Against this 
backdrop, this study has the potential to contribute not 
only to the established stream of research on IT project 
escalation, but also to the broader stream of literature 
on escalation of commitment by providing novel 
theoretical explanations as to future-oriented 
considerations that may influence escalation decisions.  
3 Evaluability Bias and the 
Fairness Effect 
We focus on evaluability bias (often referred to in the 
literature as the evaluability hypothesis (Hsee, 1996)) 
and the fairness effect (Bazerman et al., 1995) because 
we believe they can offer new theoretical insights into 
the escalation of commitment to new software product 
development. While normative decision theories 
assume that people tend to be rational decision makers 
and have consistent preferences, research has shown 
that individuals’ preference or value assessment can 
change depending on evaluation conditions 
(Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992; Hsee, 1996; 
Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999). One 
factor that can affect an individual’s preference is the 
evaluability of an object’s attributes. In addition, in 
making financial or purchasing decisions it is known 
that an individual’s preference can be heavily 
influenced by the relative amount of a financial reward 
promised to him or her in comparison to the amount 
promised to others (i.e., perceptions of fairness). In 
what follows, we offer a concise review of evaluability 
bias and the fairness effect. 
First, while some attributes are inherently easier to 
evaluate than others (e.g., the cover of a book is easier 
to evaluate than its contents), it is commonly known 
that the evaluability of an attribute improves when it is 
presented with some form of comparative information, 
such as using a scale. For instance, in an experiment 
that involved a hiring decision, Hsee (1996) found that 
when individuals were asked to evaluate a job 
candidate for a computer programmer position, their 
preference was largely determined by an attribute of 
the candidate that was presented using a scale (e.g., 4.9 
GPA on a 5-point scale) as opposed to an attribute of 
the candidate that was not presented on a scale (e.g., 
experience writing 10 programs). Based on a series of 
laboratory experiments, Hsee (1996) proposed that 
people’s preferences for an object are more heavily 
influenced by attributes that are easy to evaluate. 
Applying this concept to the context of software 
product development, people evaluating a software 
product under development may base their decision 
more on a software attribute that is easy to evaluate 
than on a software attribute that is difficult to evaluate. 
For example, the user interface on a software product 
may be easier to evaluate than the quality of the data 
structure that underlies the product. Thus, in evaluating 
a software product, individuals may base their decision 
disproportionally on the user interface (an attribute that 
is easy to evaluate), essentially underweighting the 
data structure (an attribute that is more difficult to 
evaluate). Furthermore, we suggest that evaluability 
bias is likely to play an especially important role in the 
software product development context due to the 
invisibility of software (Abdel-Hamid & Madnick, 
1991; Brooks, 1987), which makes it inherently 
difficult to evaluate certain attributes of a software 
product under development.  
Second, the fairness effect relates to a broad body of 
work on fairness in decision-making. It is well 
documented that people sometimes make choices that 
are inconsistent with their economic self-interest. One 
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reason for this has to do with social-comparison 
processes (Tenbrunsel & Diekmann, 2002) that 
produce decisions that are in conflict with underlying 
preferences. For instance, in workplace settings 
comparative reward information can lead people to 
focus more on the relative amount promised to them in 
comparison to the amount promised to others, as 
opposed to the absolute amount they stand to gain. 
Bazerman et al. (1994) found that individuals who 
evaluated a job offer that paid equally compared to 
other job candidates (e.g., $75K for self, $75K for 
others) liked the offer, whereas individuals who 
evaluated a job offer that paid more in absolute amount 
but paid less compared to other job candidates (e.g., 
$85K for self, $95K for others) did not like the offer. 
In addition, Bazerman et al. (1992) found that in 
evaluating an outcome consisting of a payoff for 
oneself and a payoff for another person, individuals 
tend to care more about relative payoffs than absolute 
payoffs. Specifically, Bazerman et al. (1992) found 
that people who were asked to evaluate the payoff of 
$500 for oneself and $500 for another person (i.e., an 
equal payoff) reacted more positively to their payoff, 
than did people who were asked to evaluate the payoff 
of $600 for oneself and $800 for another person (i.e., 
an unequal but greater payoff). This decision tendency 
has been demonstrated in different decision settings, 
including hiring decisions (Bazerman, Schroth, Shah, , 
Diekmann, & Tenbrunsel, 1994) and job offer 
acceptance decisions (Tenbrunsel & Diekmann, 2002). 
4 Development of Hypotheses 
In this section, we theorize how evaluability bias 
concerning software attributes and the fairness effect 
that arises from the relative amount of a personal 
financial reward, affect escalation decisions in the 
context of software product development. 
4.1 Evaluability Bias and Escalation of 
Commitment 
In order to evaluate a software product under 
development, decision makers commonly assess the 
quality of software attributes. Such information may be 
presented using a scale, or with no scale. Using a scale 
allows decision makers to easily evaluate how good a 
software product is on that attribute (e.g., a score of 5 
on a 5-point scale for “reliability” can be easily 
interpreted as excellent). In contrast, when an attribute 
is presented in absolute terms and with no scale (e.g., 
350 “software functions”), it is more difficult to judge 
the quality of the product based on that attribute. 
Drawing on the notion of evaluability bias, we suggest 
that the overall evaluation of a product will be 
determined largely by the evaluation of a software 
attribute that is easy to evaluate (e.g., one that is 
presented on a scale) rather than by the evaluation of a 
software attribute that is difficult to evaluate (e.g., one 
that is presented without a scale). Based on this line of 
reasoning, we expect that evaluability bias concerning 
software attributes will have a significant effect on the 
perceived attractiveness of a software product. 
Specifically, the decision maker will perceive the 
software product to be attractive when the easy-to-
evaluate attribute carries a superior value. The 
arguments presented above suggest the following 
hypothesis: 
H1a: When an easy-to-evaluate attribute carries a 
superior value, evaluability bias will have a 
positive influence on the perceived 
attractiveness of a software product (even if the 
difficult-to-evaluate attribute carries an inferior 
value).  
In addition, we expect that the perceived attractiveness 
of a software product induced by evaluability bias will 
positively affect escalation of commitment. Lee, Keil, 
& Wong (2015) found that expectancy beliefs 
concerning goal attainment have a positive effect on 
the escalation of commitment. Further, prior escalation 
studies suggest that some hope of success or a positive 
belief is required for escalation of commitment to 
occur (Heath, 1995). In other words, individuals 
escalate their commitments to a previously chosen 
course of action based on a positive assessment of 
future outcomes that may result from the continued 
commitment. In the context of software product 
development, this would presumably include situations 
in which a positive appraisal of the product (based on 
its attributes) leads decision makers to conclude that a 
product launch will be successful. While there may be 
other factors that influence decision makers’ 
assessment of the viability of a new software product, 
because of the invisible nature of software (Abdel-
Hamid & Madnick, 1991; Brooks, 1987) and the 
uncertainty associated with developing new products 
(Urban, Weinberg, & Hauser, 1996), decision makers 
must rely heavily on their own subjective evaluation of 
software attributes. We expect that if an appraisal of 
software attributes causes a decision maker to perceive 
the software product under development as attractive, 
this will have a positive influence on his or her decision 
to continue working on a troubled software product 
development project. Based on the arguments 
presented above, we hypothesize: 
H1b: The perceived attractiveness of a software 
product will have a positive influence on the 
escalation of commitment to new software 
product development. 
4.2 The Fairness Effect and Escalation of 
Commitment 
A common practice in the context of software product 
development is to offer a personal financial reward that 
is tied in some way to the success of the product 




launch. The perception of such a financial reward may 
be influenced by the fairness effect. Prior research on 
fairness and decision-making demonstrates that people 
are biased in a self-serving manner in that they pay 
great attention to the amount of the payoff that they 
receive in comparison to the amount of the payoff that 
others receive (Bazerman et al. 1995). This concern 
over fairness means that people become more focused 
on comparative payoffs and making sure that they 
attain an equal share of the pie, and become less 
focused on the absolute amount of payoffs that they 
receive (i.e., maximizing their payoffs). Thus, when 
financial rewards are promised to project members, the 
fairness effect can influence project managers’ 
perceived attractiveness of the financial reward 
promised to them. The fairness effect suggests that 
decision makers will find a promised financial reward 
that is equal to that of a co-worker to be more attractive 
than a promised financial reward that is less than that 
offered to a co-worker. The arguments presented above 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
H2a: When the amount of one’s financial reward is 
equal to that of others, the fairness effect will 
have a positive influence on the perceived 
attractiveness of a financial reward.  
Prior research on IT project escalation has found that 
the decision to continue working on troubled IT 
projects is driven by the anticipation that continued 
investment may lead to a large payoff (Keil, 1995). 
This indicates that decision makers consider a potential 
financial reward associated with successful completion 
of the project in escalation situations and that this can 
lead them to continue working on a troubled IT project. 
Furthermore, in escalation situations, decision makers 
generate a subjective expected utility associated with a 
decision to continue by comparing potential rewards 
and the costs of continuing the failing course of action 
(Brockner, 1992). This suggests that decision makers 
may be more likely to continue pursuing a failing 
course of action when there is a personal financial 
reward associated with completing the course of action 
and when they perceive the reward to be attractive. 
Further, Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara, & Miles 
(2015) suggested that reward systems are likely to have 
a significant influence on whether or not people decide 
to continue with a failing course of action. Drawing on 
the above arguments and prior research on escalation, 
we theorize that if decision makers perceive a financial 
reward to be attractive, this will have a positive effect 
on their decision to continue pursuing troubled 
software product development projects. Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
H2b: The perceived attractiveness of a financial 
reward will have a positive influence on the 
escalation of commitment to new software 
product development.   
Before proceeding to the method section, we present 
our overall research model showing the hypothesized 
relationships. We included age, gender, and IT-related 
work experience as controls, as these variables have 
been found to have significant effects on business 




Figure 1. Research Model 




Our study involved two experiments: one using student 
subjects (Experiment 1) and one using IT professionals 
(Experiment 2). We chose the experimental method in 
order to examine the causal effects of evaluability bias 
and the fairness effect on escalation decisions in new 
software product development. Experiments are useful 
for demonstrating that causal effects exist (Kozlowski, 
2009). They also help rule out the possibility of reverse 
causality, since the experimenter manipulates 
independent variable(s) (Colquitt, 2008). Thus, well-
designed experiments allow researchers to achieve 
higher internal validity than is possible with other 
research methods. For this reason, experiments have 
been widely used by scholars who study evaluability 
bias and the fairness effect (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1992; 
Hsee 1996; and González-Vallejoa & Moran, 2001), as 
well as those who study escalation (e.g., Staw, 1976; 
Keil, Tan et al., 2000; Moon, 2001; and Wong & 
Kwong, 2007). In the following section, we discuss the 
experimental design, manipulations, and measures 
used in our experiments. 
5.1 Experimental Design and Decision 
Task 
Both experiments involved a 2x2 factorial design in 
which we manipulated the ratings of two software 
attributes and the amount of financial reward relative 
to a project co-manager. For the experimental decision 
task, we created a new software product development 
scenario based on Arkes and Blumer’s (1985) classic 
“radar blank” plane scenario. We chose this as our 
model because it involves a new product development 
context and has been widely adapted and used in 
escalation studies (e.g., Conlon & Garland, 1993; 
Moon, 2001; and Wong, 2005). Appendix A shows the 
actual scenario we used. In the scenario, participants 
were told that they had been working with a colleague 
as a co-manager on a project that was expected to 
deliver a lucrative business intelligence (BI) product 
for external sale. Participants were also told that the 
project had fallen behind schedule due to beta testing, 
and that, in the meantime, another firm had begun 
 
1 While decision makers can access other attributes that are 
important in evaluating a software product under 
development, we limited our focus to two attributes in order 
to keep the experiment manageable and because our aim was 
to focus on the theoretical mechanism through which 
evaluability bias can influence escalation of commitment to 
troubled software product development projects, not the 
specific attributes per se.   
2 This manipulation was modeled after the manipulation used 
in an experiment by Hsee (1996). In that experiment, subjects 
were asked to play the role of a company owner and evaluate 
marketing a BI software package that was reportedly 
superior. This constituted the negative feedback about 
the project. Further, within the scenario participants 
were provided with the ratings of two software 
attributes and information about personal financial 
rewards, and then asked to make a decision about 
whether or not to continue working on the project. 
5.2 Manipulations 
First, to test the effect associated with evaluability bias, 
we chose two software attributes that are often used in 
evaluating a software product: functionality 
(operationalized as the number of modules) and 
reliability (operationalized as a reliability rating on a 
5-point scale).1 We chose functionality and reliability 
because these two attributes have been shown to be the 
two most important criteria for evaluating software 
products (Keil & Tiwana, 2005). Since the theory 
behind evaluability bias suggests that people will focus 
on attributes that are easy to evaluate, it was necessary 
to have one attribute that could be operationalized in 
an easy-to-evaluate fashion and one that could be 
operationalized in a difficult-to-evaluate fashion. By 
expressing reliability in the form of a rating on a 5-
point scale, we made this attribute easy to evaluate and 
by representing functionality in terms of the number of 
modules, we made this attribute difficult to evaluate. 
Using these two software attributes, we created two 
experimental conditions (see Table 1). In one 
condition, the reliability was highly rated (5.0/5.0) and 
the number of modules was relatively small (50). In the 
other, the reliability was mediocre (3.0/5.0) and the 
number of modules was relatively large (350).2 We 
reasoned that decision makers’ evaluation of the 
software product under development would be more 
strongly influenced by the software attribute that was 
easy to evaluate (i.e., reliability) than the software 
attribute that was difficult to evaluate (i.e., number of 
modules). Based on this, we predicted that decision 
makers in the superior reliability / inferior number of 
modules condition would perceive the software 
product under development to be more attractive than 
decision makers in the inferior reliability / superior 
number of modules condition. 
a job candidate for a computer programmer position based 
on two attributes: undergraduate grade point average (GPA) 
and experience with a special computer language named KY. 
GPA was given on a 5-point scale and easier to evaluate than 
the KY language experience, which was presented as the 
number of KY programs that the candidate had written in the 
past two years. Using these attributes, two experimental 
conditions were created. In one, the GPA was high (4.9/5.0) 
and the number of programs was low (10). In the other, the 
GPA was low (3.0/5.0) and the number of programs was high 
(70). 








Number of modules 
(difficult-to-evaluate attribute) 
Superior reliability / inferior 
number of modules condition 
5.0/5.0 50 
Inferior reliability / superior 
number of modules condition 
3.0/5.0 350 
Table 2. Experimental Conditions: Fairness Effect 
 
Oneself Co-manager 
Equal-amount condition $10,000 $10,000 
Unequal-amount condition $15,000 $20,000 
Second, to test the fairness effect associated with a 
financial reward, we introduced a financial bonus tied 
to the software product’s successful launch, which 
would be divided between the two project co-managers 
(see Table 2). In one experimental condition, 
participants were told that both they and their co-
manager would each receive a $10,000 bonus (equal-
amount condition). In the other condition, participants 
were told that they would receive a $15,000 bonus and 
their co-manager would receive a $20,000 bonus 
(unequal-amount condition).3 We reasoned that decision 
makers would be highly influenced by the relative 
amount of the financial reward promised to them in 
comparison to their co-manager. Thus, we anticipated 
that decision makers in the equal-amount condition 
would perceive the reward to be more attractive than 
decision makers in the unequal-amount condition. We 
expected this effect to occur despite the fact that the 
unequal- amount condition offered a larger bonus. 
Finally, to control for other factors that might influence 
the perception of fairness, the project co-manager was 
described as having graduated with the same degree 
from the same school as the decision maker, and as 
having the same number of years at the company. 
5.3 Measures 
We measured escalation of commitment by assessing 
willingness to continue—the most widely used 
approach in previous escalation studies (e.g., Garland, 
1990; Moon, 2001; and Keil, Tan et al. 2000). Because 
project managers do not typically possess the decision 
rights to continue or abandon an endeavor but often 
make recommendations to senior management, we 
created two measurement items to align with the 
typical situation in most organizations. For both 
perceived attractiveness of a software product and 
 
3  This manipulation approach is consistent with prior 
research on the fairness effect (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1992), 
perceived attractiveness of a financial reward, we 
adapted four measurement items from Sarker and 
Valacich (2010). The experiment also included a series 
of manipulation checks and some questions relating to 
age, gender, and work experience. All items were 
measured on a 7-point scale and are shown in 
Appendix B. 
6 Experiment 1 
6.1 Participants and Procedure 
For Experiment 1, we recruited 144 undergraduate 
students enrolled in IS courses at a large urban 
university in the southeastern United States. We 
obtained permission from instructors to conduct the 
experiment during class time in their regular 
classrooms. At the experiment’s outset, we explained 
the purpose of this study in lay terms without revealing 
the precise research objectives in order to avoid 
creating demand effects. Specifically, we told 
participants that this was a scenario-based experiment 
involving decision-making in the context of new 
software product development, and that they would be 
asked to play the role of a project co-manager working 
for a technology and consulting firm. We then handed 
out paper-based experimental materials, which 
included a scenario and a questionnaire. The average 
age of the participants was 25.3 years old, and the 
average IT-related work experience was 1.4 years. The 
average age was slightly older than typical college 
students because the university tends to have many 
nontraditional students who enter the school with some 
work experience. Of the participants, 104 were male 
and 40 were female. 
which manipulated the relative amount of a payoff (unequal 
vs. equal). 





6.2.1 Manipulation Checks 
To check the validity of the manipulation involving 
software attribute evaluability, we asked participants 
to answer two questions on a 7-point scale: one 
question pertained to the evaluability of the reliability 
rating (easy-to-evaluate attribute), while the other 
pertained to the evaluability of the number of 
modules (difficult-to-evaluate attribute). We 
conducted a repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to compare the perceived evaluability of 
reliability rating versus the perceived evaluability of 
the number of modules. The results indicated that 
participants perceived the reliability rating to be 
easier to evaluate (M = 4.46, SD = 1.82) than the 
number of modules (M = 3.03, SD = 1.70), and that 
this difference was statistically significant (F(1,143) 
= 74.37, p < 0.01). 
To check the validity of the manipulation involving a 
financial reward, we asked participants to answer two 
questions (also on a 7-point scale) related to the 
financial bonus and whether it was perceived as fair 
and evenhanded. We conducted a one-way ANOVA 
to determine if a statistically significant difference 
existed in how participants perceived the financial 
bonus between the equal amount group and the 
unequal amount group. The results indicated that the 
mean difference between the equal-amount condition 
(M = 5.26, SD = 1.27) and the unequal-amount 
condition (M = 3.34, SD = 1.63) was significant and 
in the expected direction (F(1,142) = 61.31, p < 0.01). 
Appendix C provides the details of how we checked 
and confirmed that the basic assumptions for 
repeated-measures ANOVA (i.e., normality and 
sphericity) and for the one-way ANOVA (i.e., 
normality, independence, and homogeneity of 
variance) held. 
6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, 
and Reliability 
As Table 3 shows, we examined the means, standard 
deviations, and correlations among study variables. 
Escalation of commitment had significant 
correlations with evaluability bias (0.22), fairness 
effect (0.21), perceived attractiveness of a software 
product (0.53), and perceived attractiveness of a 
financial reward (0.34). Further, all three measured 
variables exhibited adequate reliability. 
6.2.3 Hypothesis Testing 
First, we conducted a factorial ANOVA to examine 
the influences of evaluability bias and the fairness 
effect on escalation of commitment across different 
experimental groups. The ANOVA results indicated 
that the participants in the superior reliability / 
inferior number of modules condition had a greater 
willingness to continue (M = 5.25, SD = 1.30) than 
the participants in the inferior reliability / superior 
number of modules condition (M = 4.62, SD = 1.55), 
and this difference was statistically significant 
(F(1,140) = 7.67, p < 0.01, 2p = 0.05). Further, the 
same analysis also showed that the participants in the 
equal-amount condition had a greater willingness to 
continue (M = 5.25, SD = 1.37) than the participants 
in the unequal-amount condition (M = 4.65, SD = 
1.48), and this difference was statistically significant 
(F(1,140) = 6.75, p < 0.05, 2p = .05). These results 
were consistent with what we expected based on 
evaluability bias and the fairness effect. No 
significant interaction effect was found between the 
two independent variables. For the ANOVA, we 
checked and confirmed three basic assumptions 
(normality, independence, and homogeneity of 
variance) as explained in Appendix C. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Reliability 
  1 2 3 4 5 M SD α 
1 Evaluability bias+ –     .49 .50 – 
2 Fairness effect+ .01 –    .51 .50 – 
3 
Perceived attractiveness of a 
software product 
.26** .05 –   
4.62 1.16 .88 
4 
Perceived attractiveness of a 
financial reward 
.08 .17* .27** –  
5.34 1.35 .86 
5 Escalation of commitment 22** .21* .53** .34** – 4.94 1.46 .73 
Notes: N = 144; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
+ Manipulated variables: we coded “inferior reliability / superior functionality” and “an unequal amount reward” as 0, and coded 
“superior reliability / inferior functionality” and “an equal amount reward” as 1 
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Next, we proceeded to test two pairs of hypotheses 
(H1a/H1b and H2a/H2b). Since each pair of 
hypotheses involved a path model (evaluability 
bias→perceived attractiveness of a software 
product→escalation & fairness effect→perceived 
attractiveness of a financial reward→escalation), we 
adopted a process model analysis approach 
recommended by Hayes (2013) and used the 
PROCESS SPSS macro (version 3) provided at 
www.processmacro.org. Further, this approach uses 
bootstrapping, which is a statistical method based on 
random resampling with replacement from the dataset 
(Shrout & Bolger, 2002; Preacher & Hayes, 2008) that 
does not require an assumption of normality. 
We conducted two separate bootstrapping analyses 
with 5,000 resamples for each pair of hypotheses, and 
we included age, gender, and IT-related work 
experience as control variables. For each analysis, we 
configured our model based on model 4 in Hayes 
(2013). The results of the first bootstrapping analysis 
indicated that evaluability bias had a significant 
positive influence on the perceived attractiveness of a 
software product ( = 0.58; lower-level confidence 
interval (LLCI) = 0.20, upper-level confidence interval 
(ULCI) = 0.95), and that the perceived attractiveness of 
a software product had a significant positive influence 
on escalation of commitment ( = 0.62; LLCI = 0.43, 
ULCI = 0.81). These results provided support for H1a 
and H1b. In addition, the results of the analysis indicated 
that the indirect effect of evaluability bias (through 
perceived attractiveness of a software product) on the 
escalation of commitment was significant (ab path effect 
= 0.36, LLCI = 0.12, ULCI = 0.62) and that the direct 
effect of evaluability bias on escalation of commitment 
was not significant (c path effect = 0.26; LLCI = -0.17, 
ULCI = 0.69), suggesting full mediation. 
The results of the second bootstrapping analysis 
indicated that the fairness effect had a significant 
positive influence on the perceived attractiveness of a 
financial reward ( = 0.49; LLCI = 0.04, ULCI = 0.94), 
and that the perceived attractiveness of a financial 
reward had a significant positive influence on 
escalation of commitment ( = 0.36; LLCI = 0.19, ULCI 
= 0.53). These results provided support for H2a and H2b. 
In addition, the results of the analysis indicated that the 
indirect effect of the fairness effect (through the perceived 
attractiveness of a financial reward) on the escalation of 
commitment was significant (ab path effect = 0.18, LLCI 
= 0.01, ULCI = 0.41) and that the direct effect of the 
fairness effect on the escalation of commitment was not 
significant (c path effect = 0.40; LLCI = -0.07, ULCI = 
0.86), suggesting full mediation. 
6.2.4 Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 1 provide initial empirical 
evidence on how evaluability bias concerning software 
attributes and the fairness effect associated with a 
personal financial reward can influence the escalation 
of commitment to software product development. 
First, we found that participants’ escalation decisions 
are swayed by software attributes that are easier to 
evaluate. Specifically, participants in the superior 
reliability / inferior number of modules condition were 
more willing to continue working on troubled software 
product development projects than were participants in 
the inferior reliability / superior number of modules 
condition. Further, the perceived attractiveness of a 
software product was found to fully mediate this effect. 
Second, we found that participants’ escalation 
decisions were influenced by the relative amount of a 
reward compared to a peer. Specifically, participants 
showed greater willingness to continue working on 
troubled projects when their reward was equal to that 
of a peer than when their reward was smaller than that 
of a peer (even though the absolute amount of the 
participant’s award was greater in the latter case). 
Further, we found that perceived attractiveness of a 
financial reward fully mediated this effect.  
After obtaining encouraging results in Experiment 1, 
we replicated the experiment with South Korean IT 
professionals. We conducted this additional 
experiment with IT professionals because, while prior 
research found that business students can be adequate 
subjects for business decision-making research 
(Remus, 1986), there is always the possibility that 
students may not respond to the stimulus materials in 
the same way that IT professionals might respond. The 
primary purpose of the second experiment was to 
increase generalizability by showing that the results 
obtained with the student subjects not only held up 
with experienced professionals but across a different 
cultural setting as well. The second experiment also 
has replication value and adds robustness to our 
findings. 
7 Experiment 2 
7.1 Participants and Procedure 
For Experiment 2, we recruited 133 IT professionals in 
South Korea through professional contacts; all 
participants had a minimum of three years’ work 
experience in IT development projects. During 
recruitment, we explained the purpose of this study in 
lay terms, without revealing the precise research 
objectives in order to avoid demand effects. 
Specifically, we informed participants that we were 
conducting a scenario-based experiment involving 
decision-making in new software product development 
and that they would be asked to play the role of a 
project co-manager working for a technology and 
consulting firm. We sent those who volunteered to take 
part in the experiment an email with a link to the web-
based experimental materials, including the scenario 
and questionnaire. The average age of participants was 
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38 years old, and the average IT-related work 
experience was 9.9 years. Of the participants, 111 were 
male, 20 were female, and 2 did not indicate their 
gender.  
Experiment 2 involved the same 2x2 factorial design 
used in Experiment 1 in which we manipulated the 
ratings of two software attributes and the amount of 
financial reward relative to a project co-manager. We 
followed an iterative approach, translating the 
materials used in Experiment 1 into Korean and then 
back-translating them into English. We did this to 
ensure that the meaning of the scenario and the 
questions would be the same for participants in both 
countries. Two of the authors performed the Korean 
translation; then, to verify the translation’s accuracy, 
both the original and translated experiment materials 
were examined by a neutral bilingual researcher who 
was not involved in this study or aware of its purpose. 
Two other independent translators back-translated the 
Korean version into English. Finally, the original and 
back-translated items were compared and another 
round of translation and back-translation was 
conducted, whereupon both translators agreed that the 
meaning had been preserved in the two versions. 
7.2 Results 
7.2.1 Manipulation Checks 
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA and 
found that participants perceived the reliability rating 
to be easier to evaluate (M = 3.89, SD = 1.50) than the 
number of modules (M = 3.28, SD = 1.41) and that this 
difference was statistically significant (F(1,131) = 
24.92, p < 0.01). We conducted a one-way ANOVA 
and found that the mean difference between the equal- 
amount condition (M = 4.83, SD = 1.18) and the 
unequal-amount condition (M = 3.71, SD = 1.23) was 
significant and in the expected direction (F(1,130) = 
28.30, p < 0.01). We tested the assumptions required 
for the repeated-measures ANOVA and the one-way 
ANOVA, and found that the assumptions were met. 
7.2.2 Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and 
Reliability 
As Table 4 shows, we examined the means, standard 
deviations, and correlations among study variables. 
Escalation of commitment had significant correlations 
with evaluability bias (0.21), fairness effect (0.20), 
perceived attractiveness of a software product (0.54), 
and perceived attractiveness of a financial bonus 
(0.51). Further, all three measured variables exhibited 
high reliability. 
7.2.3 Hypothesis Testing 
First, we conducted a factorial ANOVA and found that 
the participants in the superior reliability / inferior 
number of modules condition had a greater willingness 
to continue (M = 5.39, SD = 1.40) than the participants 
in the inferior reliability / superior number of modules 
condition (M = 4.71, SD = 1.80) and that this difference 
was statistically significant (F(1,128) = 6.50, p < 0.05, 
2p = .05). Further, the same analysis also showed that 
the participants in the equal-amount condition had a 
greater willingness to continue (M = 5.38, SD = 1.40) 
than the participants in the unequal-amount condition 
(M = 4.71, SD = 1.80) and that this difference was 
statistically significant (F(1,128) = 6.24, p < 0.05, 2p 
= 0.05). These results were consistent with those 
obtained in Experiment 1. No significant interaction 
effect was found between the two independent 
variables. Further, we checked and confirmed the three 
basic assumptions for the ANOVA. 
Next, we proceeded to test two pairs of hypotheses 
(H1a/H1b & H2a/H2b) using the same approach used 
in Experiment 1 (two separate bootstrapping analyses 
with 5,000 resamples for each pair of hypotheses). The 
results of the first bootstrapping analysis indicated that 
the evaluability bias had a significant positive 
influence on the perceived attractiveness of a software 
product ( = 0.53; LLCI = 0.04, ULCI = 1.01) and that 
the perceived attractiveness of a software product had 
a significant positive influence on the escalation of 
commitment ( = 0.64; LLCI = 0.47, ULCI = 0.82). 
These results provided support for H1a and H1b.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Reliability 
  1 2 3 4 5 M SD α 
1 Evaluability bias+ –     0.52 0.5 – 
2 Fairness effect+ 0.03 –    0.52 0.5 – 
3 
Perceived attractiveness of a 
software product 
0.19* 0.02 –   
3.97 1.38 0.94 
4 
Perceived attractiveness of a 
financial reward 
0.14 0.15 0.49** –  
4.06 1.42 0.92 
5 Escalation of commitment 0.21* 0.20* 0.54** 0.51** – 5.04 1.65 0.90 
Notes: N = 133; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
+ Manipulated variables: we coded “inferior reliability / superior functionality” and “an unequal amount reward” as 0, and coded 
“superior reliability / inferior functionality” and “an equal amount reward” as 1 
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In addition, the results of the analysis indicated that the 
indirect effect of the evaluability bias (through the 
perceived attractiveness of a software product) on the 
escalation of commitment was significant (ab path effect = 
0.34, LLCI = 0.03, ULCI = 0.75) and that the direct effect 
of the evaluability bias on the escalation of commitment 
was not significant (c path effect = 0.37; LLCI = -0.13, 
ULCI = 0.87), suggesting full mediation. 
The results of the second bootstrapping analysis indicated 
that the fairness effect had a significant positive influence 
on the perceived attractiveness of a financial reward ( = 
0.50; LLCI = 0.01, ULCI = 1.00), and that the perceived 
attractiveness of a financial reward had a significant 
positive influence on the escalation of commitment ( = 
0.59; LLCI = 0.41, ULCI = 0.77). These results provided 
support for H2a and H2b. In addition, the results of the 
analysis indicated that the indirect effect of the fairness 
effect (through the perceived attractiveness of a financial 
reward) on the escalation of commitment was significant 
(ab path effect = 0.30, LLCI = 0.01, ULCI = 0.69) and that 
the direct effect of the fairness effect on the escalation of 
commitment was not significant (c path effect = 0.37; LLCI 
= -0.14, ULCI = 0.89), suggesting full mediation. 
7.2.4 Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 2 provide added support 
for the influences of evaluability bias and the fairness 
effect on the escalation of commitment to new 
software product development. The results of 
Experiment 2, which involved IT professionals in a 
different cultural setting with significant IT work 
experience (an average of 9.9 years), were consistent 
with the findings of Experiment 1, which involved IT 
students. These findings are particularly valuable as 
they indicate that Experiment 1’s results are 
generalizable to working IT professionals and hold up 
across two different cultures. As with IT students in the 
US, IT professionals in South Korea were more willing 
to continue working on troubled projects given an 
attribute (reliability) that was highly rated on a relative 
scale. They were also more willing to continue 
working on a troubled project if offered a reward that 
was equal to a peer, and less willing to continue if their 
reward was smaller than that of a peer. Further, we 
found consistent support for our theorized mediating 
mechanisms underlying these effects. 
8 General Discussion 
8.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study makes two important theoretical 
contributions. First, it offers novel theoretical 
explanations based on evaluability bias (Hsee, 1996) 
and the fairness effect (Bazerman et al., 1995) for why 
escalation may occur in the context of new software 
product development, thus adding to the body of 
knowledge on IS project escalation. To date, prior 
research has focused on applying well-known 
theoretical lenses to understanding the escalation of 
commitment in software and product development 
settings, such as self-justification (Staw, 1976), loss 
aversion (Garland, 1990; Staw & Hoang, 1995), and 
goal proximity (Conlon & Garland, 1993). While these 
perspectives are useful for understanding escalation 
decisions, they do not leverage the context of software 
product development. This study contributes to the IS 
project escalation literature by leveraging the context 
of software product development, which can include 
evaluating software attributes of a software product 
under development and weighing a personal financial 
reward tied to a successful product launch. By drawing 
on evaluability bias and the fairness effect, we were 
able to leverage the context of software product 
development in a way that advances knowledge in this 
area. Further, our study highlights mediating 
mechanisms underlying evaluability bias and the 
fairness effect, thus offering a more nuanced 
understanding of how evaluability bias and the fairness 
effect influence the escalation of commitment to 
software product development. 
Second, our study also contributes to the broader body 
of literature on the escalation of commitment in several 
respects. Prior to our study, neither evaluability bias 
nor the fairness effect had been investigated in 
escalation research, and probing the effects of these 
factors represents a contribution to the escalation 
literature. In addition, while prior research has 
emphasized retrospective thinking (e.g., fixation on 
sunk cost) as escalation drivers, our study adds to a 
small but growing stream of research that focuses on 
prospective thinking in escalation of commitment 
(Moon, 2001; Wong & Kwong, 2007). Further, while 
prior research has suggested that the escalation of 
commitment occurs when there exists some hope of 
success (Conlon & Garland, 1993), it has not been 
previously shown what drives people to anticipate 
positive outcomes in escalation situations despite 
negative feedback. Our study begins to address this 
question by offering new insights into how evaluability 
bias and the fairness effect can influence the perceived 
attractiveness of anticipatory outcomes (in our case, 
the attractiveness of the software product itself and the 
financial reward associated with a successful launch).  
8.2 Practical Implications 
This study has several important practical 
contributions. First, it underscores that bias can occur 
when decision makers evaluate multiple attributes of a 
software product under development. Specifically, in 
evaluating a software product, managers may consider 
several attributes of the product, but some attributes 
may be inherently easier to evaluate than others. When 
this occurs, managers’ evaluation of the product may 
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be more heavily influenced by attributes that are easy 
to evaluate, while attributes that are difficult to 
evaluate are not given the attention that they deserve. 
One potential consequence of such a biased evaluation 
is continued commitment to a troubled project. One 
way to overcome this evaluability bias is to obtain the 
necessary domain knowledge to properly assess 
difficult to evaluate attributes (Hsee & Zhang, 2010). 
For example, when dealing with software attributes 
that are difficult to evaluate, it may be advisable to 
consult an expert to aid in the assessment process. 
Another way to overcome evaluability bias is to 
improve the evaluability of all relevant attributes. This 
can be done by using a standard scale or baseline for 
comparison purposes which can improve evaluability 
(Hsee, 1996). In fact, comparative information is 
commonly used in various business-decision settings, 
including hiring decisions (Bazerman et al., 1992) and 
performance evaluation of employees (Goffin, Jelley, 
Powell, & Johnston, 2009; Moore & Klein, 2008). 
Using these approaches can help decision makers to 
make more informed decisions based on the evaluation 
of all relevant attributes of a software product as 
opposed to a biased evaluation that is driven by easy-
to-evaluate attributes. 
Second, software requirements determine the 
functionality (i.e., functional requirements) and 
performance criteria (i.e., nonfunctional requirements) 
of a software application. In evaluating a software 
application, a set of attributes that are primarily 
concerned with the functionality aspect of the 
application is tested against functional requirements 
(e.g., a set of modules that have been identified during 
the requirements determination stage). In contrast, a 
set of other attributes that are primarily concerned with 
the performance aspect of the application is tested 
against non-functional requirements (e.g., reliability, 
efficiency, portability, etc.). In this study, we chose to 
investigate one functionality-related attribute (number 
of modules) and one performance-related attribute 
(reliability) and theorized that number of modules is 
inherently more difficult to evaluate than reliability. 
Evaluating performance-related attributes typically 
involves technical testing or using mathematical 
metrics. Hence, performance-related attributes are 
relatively easy to evaluate. In contrast, evaluating 
functionality-related attributes often depends on 
subjective perceptions of decision makers or potential 
users—for example: How many features is good 
enough (i.e., number of modules)? How easy it is to 
use the features (i.e., usability)? and so forth. Thus, 
functionality-related attributes may be inherently more 
difficult to evaluate. The results of our study show that 
decision makers base their escalation decisions largely 
on easy-to-evaluate attributes, and this finding 
indicates that decision makers may fail to adequately 
consider how good or bad a product is in terms of 
difficult-to-evaluate attributes (e.g., functionality-
related attributes). Therefore, one practical implication 
of our work is that managers should be aware of the 
potential of evaluability bias to influence decision-
making. Further, they should take steps to develop 
metrics that can aid in assessing difficult-to-evaluate 
software attributes. 
Third, it is well known that people are motivated by 
financial incentives. One implication of our work is 
that people respond more acutely to the relative 
amount of financial incentives assigned to them (in 
comparison to that of peers) than the absolute amount. 
While we believe financial incentives can be a useful 
tool to enhance the motivation of employees, it may 
not be advisable to publicly disclose the actual amount 
that will be given to each employee as doing so can 
trigger the fairness effect and cause undesirable 
behavioral consequences. For example, project 
managers may become overly committed to a project 
when they know their financial incentive is equal or 
greater than that of their peer, or they may become 
demotivated when they know their financial incentive 
is less than that of their peer.  
8.3 Limitations and Directions for Future 
Research 
As an initial step toward understanding the role of 
evaluability bias and the fairness effect in the 
escalation of commitment to a new software product 
development project, we conducted two laboratory 
experiments. While laboratory experiments offer 
strong internal validity, external validity is often 
sacrificed to some degree, as experimental settings 
cannot possibly replicate all of the nuances of actual 
organizational settings. Despite this shortcoming, our 
primary objective was to investigate evaluability bias 
and the fairness effect in escalation decisions, thus a 
controlled environment was necessary. Further, in the 
escalation literature, the findings of research based on 
experimental data have been quite consistent with the 
findings of research based on field data, including case 
study data (Keil, 1995), longitudinal data (Staw, 
Barsade, & Koput, 1995), secondary data (Staw & 
Hoang, 1995), and survey data (Keil, Mann, & Rai, 
2000). Nonetheless, we acknowledge that despite the 
positive features of laboratory experiments, one 
direction for future research is to investigate how 
evaluability bias and the fairness effect manifest 
themselves in organizational settings involving new 
software product development. 
Another direction for future research is to investigate 
factors that may reduce evaluability bias. For example, 
Hsee and Zhang (2010) suggest that prior domain 
knowledge or experience about a particular object, or 
attribute enhances evaluability. Most people, for 
example, can easily evaluate another person’s height 
without comparative information as they have 
sufficient knowledge about human height and the 
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measurement unit(s) commonly employed in this 
context. In our experiment, we controlled for 
individual differences (e.g., domain knowledge) in 
subjects through random assignment; however, 
domain knowledge could be an important factor 
moderating or reducing evaluability bias in the 
escalation of commitment. Thus, we suggest that 
further research is warranted to investigate how prior 
knowledge or experience could be used to reduce 
evaluability bias in software product development. 
In addition, in investigating the effect of evaluability 
bias associated with software attributes on escalation 
decisions, our study was limited to two software 
attributes (reliability and functionality). Clearly, there 
are other software attributes that are also important in 
evaluating software products (e.g., cost, ease of use, 
maintainability, etc.). Thus, one direction for future 
research would be to extend the findings of this study 
by exploring other software attributes. 
In terms of the fairness effect, we explored just two 
conditions; one involved equal rewards and the other 
involved unequal rewards causing the participant to 
feel disadvantaged. We did this in order to generate 
feelings of unfairness so that we might see how this 
affected escalation decisions. This begs the question of 
what might happen if the participants received $20,000 
while their colleague received $15,000 (i.e., a situation 
in which the rewards are not equal but the participant 
is not disadvantaged). The literature on fairness has 
shown that people have a strong desire for fairness and 
in ultimatum games involving splitting of a payoff with 
another individual, the average demand by the 
proposer is to keep less than 70% of the total and share 
the rest (Bazerman and Moore, 2013). This would 
suggest that some inequality might be perceived as 
“fair” from the perspective of the individual who is not 
disadvantaged by the split. Thus, while the unequal 
split described above could technically be classified as 
“unfair” we suspect that subjects would not view it as 
such because they would not be on the losing end of 
the inequality. Whether such a split would affect 
decision-making in an experiment such as ours 
remains an empirical question that can only be 
addressed by conducting additional research. 
Another direction for extending our work would be to 
examine the impact of evaluability bias and the 
fairness effect in group decision-making settings. 
Group decision-making has the potential to lead to 
better decision-making outcomes, but this is by no 
means assured and there are known pitfalls (e.g., 
groupthink) that can affect the quality of group 
decision-making. To date, neither evaluability bias nor 
the fairness effect have been investigated in group 
decision-making settings and this may represent a 
promising avenue for future research.  
8.4 Conclusion 
Despite its importance, the escalation of commitment 
to new software product development remains 
relatively unexplored. This is concerning because the 
escalation of commitment in new software product 
development settings can result in a significant waste 
of organizational resources, and can even result in an 
erosion of competitive position within the market over 
time. In fast-changing markets such as those for new 
software products, such escalation can be particularly 
problematic. The findings of this study suggest that 
evaluability bias and the fairness effect can cause 
managers to view a product and a financial reward in a 
more positive light. By altering the perceived 
attractiveness of both software product and financial 
reward, evaluability bias and the fairness effect can 
result in the escalation of commitment to troubled 
software product development projects.  
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Instructions: The task that follows is part of a study that examines individual decision-making. This is a role-playing 
experiment in which you are asked to read a scenario, and work on the decision task as if the scenario were real.  
You are a project manager for Comsoft, a technology and consulting firm. Ten months ago, you were named as a 
project co-manager with your colleague James to lead a project that was expected to deliver a lucrative business 
intelligence (BI) system, called BI-ware for external sale. Both you and James graduated together from the same school 
with the same degree and have been with the company for the same number of years. Your project was scheduled to 
be completed one month ago but the beta testing process took longer than anticipated and as a result, the project fell 
behind schedule. In the meantime, another firm has just started marketing a business intelligence software package 
that will compete directly with yours, and which is reported to be a superior product. Further, due to the delays it will 
take at least another month to complete your project. 
Now you are faced with the decision of whether to recommend to your boss, the chief executive officer (CEO), that 
your project be continued or abandoned.  When you took on this project, the CEO offered a financial bonus of $35,000 
[$20,000] that would be divided between you and James according to the table below. This bonus, if received, will 
help you pay for a new car that you have been planning to buy. However, the financial bonus will be awarded only if 
the BI-ware system becomes successful in the market. Two attributes that will influence whether BI-ware will become 
successful in the market are the number of modules and the reliability rating (i.e., how bug-free the software is). 
Please consult the table below for specific information regarding both the financial bonus and the two BI-ware 
attributes and then answer the questions that follow. 
Financial bonus information BI-ware attributes information 
Project manager A (You) $15,000 [$10,000] Number of modules 50 [350] 
Project manager B (James) $20,000 [$10,000] 
Reliability rating on a 5-point 
scale (with 5 being the highest 








Table B1. Constructs and Measurement Items 
Constructs Measures Sources 
Escalation of commitment 1. I would recommend continuing the project to the CEO. 
2. I am inclined to recommend to the CEO that this project 
be continued. 
(Garland, 1990; Moon, 
2001; Wong & Kwong, 
2007) 
Perceived attractiveness of a 
software product 
1. To what extent do you have a positive orientation 
toward the BI-ware system? 
2. To what extent do you have a good feeling about the BI-
ware system? 
3. To what extent do you consider the BI-ware system to 
be acceptable for use? 
4. Indicate the extent of attractiveness of using the BI-ware 
system. 
(Sarker & Valacich, 2010) 
Perceived attractiveness of a 
financial reward 
1. To what extent do you have a positive orientation 
toward the financial bonus offered? 
2. To what extent do you have a good feeling about the 
financial bonus that was offered? 
3. To what extent do you consider the financial bonus to be 
acceptable? 
4. Indicate the extent of attractiveness of the financial 
bonus. 
(Sarker & Valacich, 2010) 
Manipulation checks for 
evaluability 
1. How easy is it for you to evaluate how good the BI-ware 
system is based on the information provided regarding 
the reliability rating? 
2. How easy is it for you to evaluate how good the BI-ware 
system is based on the information provided regarding 
the number of modules? 
Created for this study 
Manipulation checks for 
fairness 
1. I believe that the financial bonus offered by the CEO to 
me and the co-PM is fair. 
2. I believe that the CEO put together an evenhanded 
financial bonus plan for me and the . 
Created for this study 
 
  




Table C1. Testing Assumptions of ANOVA 
Assumptions of 
ANOVA 
For each one-way and factorial ANOVA reported in this study, we checked to see if three basic assumptions 
were met: (1) normality (i.e., the residuals or errors are normally distributed); (2) independence (i.e., the 
residuals or errors are not related to each other); and (3) homogeneity of variance (i.e., the variances of the 
groups are the same). In order to check the normality assumption, we assessed the distribution of Y|X (i.e., 
the distribution of the residuals) by examining the Q-Q plot of residuals. The Q-Q plot showed clearly the 
pattern of normal distribution. In order to assess the assumption of independence, we examined a scatterplot 
of residuals on predicted values of Y. We did not see any evidence suggesting lack of independence. Further, 
since all subjects were recruited independently and no collaboration was allowed, it is reasonable to assume 
that the observations in our data were independent from each other. Third, in order to check the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance, we conducted Levene’s test, which tests the null hypothesis that the variances of 
the groups are the same. Levene’s test was not significant, indicating the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was met.  
For each repeated-measure ANOVA reported in this study, we checked to see if two basic assumptions were 
met: (1) normality (i.e., the residuals or errors are normally distributed) and (2) sphericity (i.e., the equality 
of the variances of the differences between treatment levels). First, in order to check the normality assumption, 
we assessed the distribution of Y|X (i.e., the distribution of the residuals) by examining the Q-Q plot of 
residuals. The Q-Q plot of residuals showed clearly the pattern of normal distribution. These results indicated 
that the normality assumption was met. Second, sphericity is a potential issue only if there are more than two 
treatment levels (Field, 2013) and our experiment involved only two levels (easy to evaluate and difficult to 
evaluate). Thus, sphericity was not an issue for our data. 
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